Electronic Warfare Pressure
Adaptive networks can overreact to jamming, spoofing, intermittent loss, and deceptive link conditions. AURM focuses on bounded adaptation and stable degradation.
AURM-NET by Resolvix
AURM-NET carries command-integrity, trust-continuity, custody, RF/GNSS, and audit metadata across existing communications bearers — helping distributed systems maintain operational coherence when networks degrade, fragment, or become contested.
Resolvix is a C2 systems company developing assurance middleware and survivability-governance infrastructure for degraded, contested, and disconnected operations.
AURM-NET is Resolvix’s first product: a protocol-neutral assurance layer for command integrity, trust continuity, and operational coherence across existing C2, autonomy, and communications systems.
Resolvix is focused on a central command-and-control problem:
How do distributed forces and autonomous systems maintain trust, command integrity, and operational coherence when communications become degraded, fragmented, or unavailable?
AURM-NET addresses this problem at the assurance layer. It is designed to sit above or beside existing communications, autonomy, and C2 systems — adding trust, command integrity, custody, RF/GNSS evidence, and audit metadata to support decision-making under degraded conditions.
As future Resolvix products are developed, AURM-NET will remain the company’s flagship assurance-middleware layer for contested, disconnected, and degraded operating environments.
AURM-NET is being developed as a deep-technology infrastructure layer rather than a single-domain platform — a reusable assurance capability intended to be integrated across multiple domains rather than tied to one vehicle, radio, or mission system.
Autonomous systems are increasingly operating in environments where RF links may be degraded, positioning may be manipulated, networks may partition, and stale information may become operationally unsafe.
The challenge is not only loss of connectivity. It is what autonomous systems do when degraded, delayed, spoofed, stale, or incomplete information still appears actionable.
AURM focuses on helping systems preserve mission-valid behaviour when those assumptions fail.
“Basically, everything is getting jammed and spoofed now.”
Public reporting increasingly shows that autonomous systems may not simply lose connectivity under electronic warfare pressure. They may continue operating on positioning, timing, or command assumptions that appear valid while no longer matching operational reality.
Recent reporting has also shown GPS disruption affecting high-value defence aircraft, reinforcing that PNT uncertainty is now a live operational issue across mission systems — not only small drones.
AURM focuses on the governance layer: preserving mission-valid behaviour when RF, GNSS, trust, timing, and command freshness become uncertain.
AURM-NET is designed to create a protocol-neutral metadata object that binds to a command, retask, or mission event. It travels over existing radios, waveforms, and tactical networks — adding assurance evidence that helps receivers reason about whether a command remains operationally valid as conditions degrade.
Field-level structure, configuration, and integration detail are shared with qualified partners under controlled technical disclosure.
AURM-NET is designed around bounded adaptation: deciding when to adapt, when to hold state, when to suppress stale information, and when to degrade safely. It is intended to complement physical and signal-layer protections — anti-jam GNSS receivers, positioning-integrity checks, and anomaly detectors — by adding the assurance layer that helps systems decide how to behave when those inputs become uncertain, delayed, inconsistent, or degraded.
AURM-NET’s research is focused on the principle that bounded survivability governance can preserve routing stability, suppress stale command replay, and expose degradation honestly through mission-level telemetry.
AURM-NET is designed to be protocol-neutral, so it can integrate with partner systems through the pattern that fits the deployment. Each pattern keeps authorisation, policy, and execution inside the partner’s own boundary.
AURM metadata travels with the command payload across the existing bearer.
AURM metadata travels separately and is joined to the command at the receiver.
AURM fields are mapped into existing C2 and tactical network formats by an integration adapter.
AURM-NET is not a radio, waveform, SATCOM system, Link-16 replacement, drone C2 protocol, tactical mesh network, or replacement C2 platform. It is designed to sit above or beside existing communications systems as an assurance layer — adding trust, command integrity, custody, RF/GNSS evidence, and audit metadata to support decision-making under degraded conditions.
Rather than optimising for raw throughput alone, AURM focuses on preserving mission-valid behaviour under degradation. AURM is designed to govern degradation, not to assume perfect connectivity.
AURM Survivability Governance
Potential integration categories include:
AURM-NET is currently being validated through reproducible simulation scenarios. Current work focuses on command integrity, FHC validation, custody and resynchronisation, RF/GNSS evidence abstraction, contested retasking, and static behavioural trust.
Future operationalisation will require live assurance envelopes, protocol adapters, production-grade cryptographic integration, measured RF/GNSS ingestion, human-in-the-loop workflows, and lab/HIL/field validation.
AURM operates as a survivability-governance layer that complements existing radios, autonomy stacks, tactical networks, and mission systems — preserving mission-valid behaviour where adaptation alone is not enough.
Adaptive networks can overreact to jamming, spoofing, intermittent loss, and deceptive link conditions. AURM focuses on bounded adaptation and stable degradation.
In autonomous systems, an old command may be worse than no command. AURM is designed to treat command freshness as a mission-safety property, not just a transport metric.
Under degraded links, queues can saturate and replay stale information after it is no longer useful. AURM is designed to govern custody, replay, and mission-priority traffic under pressure.
GNSS interference, spoofing, and degraded RF conditions can cause autonomous systems to drift from intended mission context. AURM is designed to support reasoning about positioning confidence, command freshness, and continuity of behaviour before suspect information becomes operationally unsafe.
Identity alone is not enough. AURM is designed around continuity of behaviour, state, and mission coherence.
AURM is designed to connect network, mission, positioning, and trust signals so degradation can be governed rather than merely observed.
AURM — Adaptive Ultra-Resilient Messaging — was founded by Greg Woolley, a former Royal New Zealand Navy Weapons Engineering Officer and technology leader with experience spanning mission systems, distributed systems, AI governance, and resilient infrastructure.
AURM combines this operational and technical experience into a focused effort to improve survivability and trust in autonomous distributed systems.
AURM is a New Zealand-headquartered sovereign deep-technology company.
AURM-NET is currently progressing through its next validation phase, including integrated operational scenarios, SDR testing, and preparation for controlled field trials.
The project welcomes discussion with organisations interested in survivability governance, resilient communications, autonomous systems, and sovereign technology capability — across the operational domains below.
Assurance metadata for autonomous teams operating under contested RF and degraded positioning.
Mission-assured command continuity for airborne platforms across intermittent links.
Behavioural continuity for uncrewed surface and subsurface vehicles in GNSS-degraded environments.
Mission-valid coordination across dispersed sensing assets under degraded conditions.
Tactical edge networks that degrade safely without fixed infrastructure dependency.
Mission-assured communications for national systems where operational continuity is non-negotiable.
AURM’s public materials describe the problem space and operational outcomes. Detailed mechanisms, validation artefacts, implementation details, and partner-specific integration pathways are shared only with qualified partners under appropriate confidentiality and security controls.
Briefings are available to qualified defence, government research, and trusted industrial partners. There are no public technical downloads — mechanisms, validation artefacts, and integration pathways are shared only under appropriate confidentiality and security controls.